Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

2002

State of Utah v. William Raymond Wallace : Brief of
Appellee
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Patrick Lindsay, Margaret P. Lindsay; Aldrich, Nelson, Weight and Esplin; Attorneys for Appellant.
Karen A. Klucznik; Assistant Attorney General; Mark L. Shurtleff; Utah Attorney General; Sirena M.
Wissler, William K. Kendall; Deputy Salt Lake County District Attorneys; Attorneys for Appellee.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellee, Utah v. Wallace, No. 20021021 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2002).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/4089

This Brief of Appellee is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
Case No. 20021021-CA
v.
WILLIAM RAYMOND WALLACE,
Defendant/Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLEE

Appeal from a restitution award included in a sentence for aggravated
kidnapping, a first degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5302 (1999), in the Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County, State
of Utah, the Honorable Ann Boyden, Presiding

PATRICK LINDSAY (8309)
MARGARET P. LINDSAY (6766)
Aldrich, Nelson, Weight & Esplin
43 East 200 North
P.O. Box "L"
Provo, UT 84603-0200
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT

KAREN A. KLUCZNIK (7912)
Assistant Attorney General
MARK L. SHURTLEFF (4666)
Utah Attorney General
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor
PO BOX 140854
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854
Telephone: (801) 366-0180
SIRENA M. WISSLER
WILLIAM K. KENDALL
Deputy Salt Lake County
District Attorneys
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

FILED L
ORAL ARGUMENT NOT REQUESTED

Utah Court of App-als

JAN 16 200t
PautetteStagg
Cte* of the Court

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
Case No. 20021021-CA
v.
WILLIAM RAYMOND WALLACE,
Defendant/Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLEE

Appeal from a restitution award included in a sentence for aggravated
kidnapping, a first degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5302 (1999), in the Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County, State
of Utah, the Honorable Ann Boyden, Presiding

PATRICK LINDSAY (8309)
MARGARET P. LINDSAY (6766)
Aldrich, Nelson, Weight & Esplin
43 East 200 North
P.O. Box "L"
Provo, UT 84603-0200
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT

KAREN A. KLUCZNIK (7912)
Assistant Attorney General
MARK L. SHURTLEFF (4666)
Utah Attorney General
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor
PO BOX 140854
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854
Telephone: (801) 366-0180
SIRENA M. WISSLER
WILLIAM K. KENDALL
Deputy Salt Lake County
District Attorneys
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

ORAL ARGUMENT NOT REQUESTED

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
TABLE OF CONTENTS

i

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

ii

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS

1

ISSUE ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

1

RELEVANT CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES

2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

2

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS

3

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

5

ARGUMENT
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY ORDERED DEFENDANT
TO PAY RESTITUTION FOR AMY TAVEY'S MURDER
WHERE DEFENDANT STATED AT SENTENCING THAT
HE "FE[LT] RESPONSIBLEFORHERDYING"
CONCLUSION

5
11

ADDENDUM A - Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201 (Supp. 2002)

i

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
STATE CASES
State v. Bickley, 2002 UT App 342, 60 P.3d 582

1, 8, 9

State v. Bums, 2000 UT 56, 4 P.3d 795

5

State v. Coonce,200l UT App 355, 36 P.3d 533

5

State v. Galli, 967 P.2d 930 (Utah 1998)

9

State v. Mast, 2001 UT App 402, 40 P.3d 1143
State v. McKinnon, 2002 UT App 214, 51P.3d729
State v. Tooele County, 2002 UT 8, 44 P.3d 680
State v. Watson, 1999 UT App 273, 987 P.2d 1289
Stephens v. Bonneville Travel, Inc., 935 P.2d 518

8, 9
5
5, 9
7,8,9
5

STATE STATUTES
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201 (Supp. 2002)

2, 6, 7, 9, 10

Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3 (Supp. 2003)

1

OTHER WORKS CITED
American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language (4th ed. 2000)
Merriam-Webster Dictionary (last visited 12/30/2003)

ii

7
6, 7

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
CaseNo.20021021-CA
v.
WILLIAM RAYMOND WALLACE,
Defendant/Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from a restitution award included in a sentence for aggravated
kidnapping, afirstdegree felony. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to the pour-over
provisions of Utah Code Annotated § 78-2a-3(2)(j) (Supp. 2003).
ISSUE ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
Did the trial court properly order defendant to pay restitution for Amy
Tavey's murder where defendant stated at sentencing that he "fe[lt]
responsible for her dying"?
This Court "will not disturb a trial court's restitution order unless it exceeds that
prescribed by law or [the court] otherwise abused its discretion." State v. Bickley, 2002
UT App 342, f 5 (internal citations omitted). This Court "review[s] a trial court's
interpretation of restitution statutes for correctness." Id.

RELEVANT CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201 (Supp. 2002), relevant to this appeal, is attached at
Addendum A.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant was charged by information with aggravated robbery and aggravated
kidnapping (R. 2-5). Notice was given with both charges that defendant was subject to
enhanced penalties because defendant used a dangerous weapon in committing the crimes
and he committed the crimes in concert with two or more persons. (R. 2-5). After a
three-day trial, defendant was convicted of aggravated kidnapping (R. 106). The jury also
found that, in committing the aggravated kidnapping, defendant did not use a firearm but *
did act in concert with two or more persons (R. 107-08). Defendant was acquitted of
aggravated robbery (R. 109).
Defendant's presentence investigation report (PSI) recommended that defendant
pay restitution both for the items taken during the robbery of the kidnapping victim, Keith
Williams, and for funeral and other costs related to the murder of Williams's girlfriend,
Amy Tavey, which occurred during the same criminal episode in which Williams was
kidnapped (PSI at 4-5, 16; Supp. Memorandum at R. 166-69). Defense counsel objected
to restitution either for the robbery, for which he was not convicted, or for the murder, for
which he was not charged (R. 214:5-6, 13). However, in his own statement to the court,
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defendant stated of Tavey's murder: "I never said to nobody that I wasn't there

I

feel responsible for her dying" (R. 214:13-14).
The trial court sentenced defendant to a prison term of fifteen-years-to-life (R.
176-77; R. 214:15). The trial court then ordered that defendant pay restitution, jointly and
severally with the others responsible, for Amy Tavey's murder (R. 176-77; R. 215:15-16).
The court did not order that defendant pay restitution to Keith Williams for the items
taken from him during the kidnapping (R. 176-77; R. 214:15-16).
Defendant timely appealed (R. 179-80). The supreme court transferred the
matter to this Court for disposition (R. 210).
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
Late in the evening on May 3, 2002, defendant and several of his friends lured
Keith Williams to their apartment, and, after beating him up, bound him with duct tape
and forced him into the trunk of his car while they threatened to kill him (R. 215:167-69,
174, 176-77, 179, 204; R. 216: 232, 235, 240, 244, 246, 376, 387-88, 393-95, 400-01; R.
217:454-56, 462, 467-68). With Williams in the trunk, defendant and two of his friends
drove off in Williams's car (R.215:185; R. 216:402, 405; R. 217:466). They were
accompanied by another car containing more of defendant's friends, as well as Williams's
girlfriend, Amy Tavey (R. 215:184-85, 186; R. 217:470).
A short while later, when the cars stopped to drop one of the friends off at a
house near the Jordan River, defendant and his friends realized that Williams was no
longer in the trunk (R. 216:247, 403). The next day, the body of Amy Tavey was found
3

in the Jordan River; Amy had been shot to death (R. 216:266, 277). That same day,
defendant was heard saying, "We killed somebody last night" (R. 216:309).
Defendant and two other friends then fled to Las Vegas, Nevada (R. 216:339-41;
R. 217:476-78, 481-83). When they were arrested a short while later, a gun matching that
used to kill Amy Tavey was found with them (R. 216:283, 340, 352, 354, 358-61).
At his sentencing, defendant told the court: "I never said to nobody that I wasn't
there, I never said what happened didn't happen. I feel responsible for her dying. Do you
know what I mean? I am not lying about that. I know there are some things that I could
have did" (R. 214:13).
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Defendant claims that the trial court erred in ordering him to pay restitution for
Amy Tavey's death because he was neither charged with nor convicted of that crime, and
because his counsel objected to such restitution at defendant's sentencing hearing.
However, under the restitution statute, a trial court can order a defendant to pay restitution
for any criminal conduct for which he admits responsibility at sentencing, whether or not
he also admits criminal liability for the conduct. In this case, defendant admitted at
sentencing that "I feel responsible for [Amy Tavey] dying." Given that admission, the
trial court properly ordered defendant to pay restitution for Amy Tavey's murder.
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ARGUMENT
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY ORDERED DEFENDANT TO
PAY RESTITUTION FOR AMY TAVEY'S MURDER WHERE
DEFENDANT STATED AT SENTENCING THAT HE "FE[LT]
RESPONSIBLE FOR HER DYING"
Defendant claims that the trial court erred in ordering him to pay restitution for
the murder of Amy Tavey because "he was never charged nor convicted of any crime
relating to the murder victim's death and . . . he didn't agree to pay said restitution but
rather contested its entry at the time of sentencing." Aplt. Br. at 33. Defendant's claim
fails under the plain language of the restitution statute.
This Court's "primary goal in interpreting statutes is to give effect to the
legislative intent, as evidenced by the plain language, in light of the purpose the statute
was meant to achieve." State v. Burns, 2000 UT 56, \ 25, 4 P.3d 795. In doing so, this
Court "assume[s] that 'each term in the statute was used advisedly.'" Stephens v.
Bonneville Travel, Inc., 935 P.2d 518, 520 (Utah 1997) (citations omitted. In addition,
"statutory term[s] should be interpreted and applied according to [their] usually accepted
meaning, where the ordinary meaning of the term[s] results in an application that is
neither unreasonably confused, inoperable, nor in blatant contradiction of the express
purpose of the statute." State v. Coonce, 2001 UT App 355, % 9, 36 P.3d 533 (citations
omitted). Finally, this Court "'avoid[s] interpretations that will render portions of a
statute superfluous or inoperative.'" State v. Tooele County, 2002 UT 8, % 10, 44 P.3d 680
(citation omitted); see also State v. McKinnon, 2002 UT App 214, % 6 n.4, 51 P.3d 729.
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Utah's restitution statute, section 76-3-201 of the Utah Code, provides:
When a person is convicted of criminal activity that has
resulted in pecuniary damages, in addition to any other sentence it
may impose, the court shall order that the defendant make
restitution to the victims, or for conduct for which the defendant
has agreed to make restitution as part of a plea agreement.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-20l(4)(a) (Supp. 2002). A "victim" is defined as "any person,"
other than a co-participant, "who the court determines has suffered pecuniary damages as
a result of the defendant's criminal activities." Id. § 76-3-20 l(l)(e)(ii).
"Criminal activities" is defined as "any offense of which the defendant is
convicted or any other criminal conduct for which the defendant admits responsibility to
the sentencing court with or without an admission of committing the criminal conduct."
Id. § 76-3-201(l)(b).
Defendant does not challenge the meaning of subsections (4)(a) or (l)(e)(i) of the
restitution statute. See Aplt. Br. at 33-36. Rather, he challenges whether restitution for
Amy Tavey's murder was appropriate under subsection (l)(b). See id.
As defendant notes in his brief, defendant was neither charged with nor
convicted of Amy Tavey's murder. See Aplt. Br. at 35. Thus, restitution for Amy's
murder was proper only if the murder was "criminal conduct for which the defendant
admitted] responsibility to the sentencing court with or without an admission of
committing the criminal conduct." Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201(1 )(b).
The plain meaning of "admit" in this context is "to concede as true or valid," "to
make acknowledgment." Merriam-Webster Dictionary, at http://www.m-w.com/cgi6

bin/dictionarv?book=Dictionarv&va=admit(last visited 12/30/2003); see also American
Heritage Dictionary of the English Language (4th ed. 2000), at
http://www.bartlebv.com/61/37/A0093700.html (last visited 12/30/2003) (defining
"admit" to include "[t]o grant to be real, valid, or true; acknowledge," "to make
acknowledgment").
The plain meaning of "responsibility" is "the quality or state of being
responsible," as in "moral, legal, or mental accountability," or "something for which one
is responsible." Merriam-Webster Dictionary, at http://www.m-w.com/cgibin/dictionarv?book=Dictionary&va=responsibilitv (last visited 12/30/2003); see also
American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language (4th ed. 2000), at
http://www.bartlebv.com/61/25/R0182500.html (last visited 12/30/2003) (defining
"responsibility" as "[t]he state, quality, or fact of being responsible," "[sjomething for
which one is responsible").
Applying these definitions to section 76-3-201(1 )(b), a person may be ordered to
pay restitution whenever he concedes or acknowledges his accountability—criminal,
moral, or otherwise—for criminal conduct which has caused another injury.
The one case cited by defendant, State v. Watson, 1999 UT App 273, 987 P.2d
1289, does not alter this conclusion. In Watson, the defendant was originally charged
with criminal homicide, attempted criminal homicide, and obstruction of justice for
allegedly driving co-defendants to and from the scene of the crime and then disposing of
the car she used to drive them. 1999 UT App 273, ^ 2. However, the defendant pleaded
7

guilty only to attempted obstruction of justice. Id. Moreover, her admissions at
sentencing suggested at most only that she heard shots, saw people running to her car, and
drove them away from the scene. 1999 UT App 273, f 4. Under those circumstances,
this Court held it was error to order the defendant to pay restitution costs associated with
the murder charge. 1999 UT App 273, H 5.
In doing so, this Court noted that, to conclude that the defendant was responsible
for the murder, "the trial court... made inferences about [the defendant's] state of mind
based upon the evidence before it." Id. Such inferences were not proper where the
restitution statute "does not ask the trial court to analyze a defendant's state of mind, but
rather asks it to focus on admissions made to the sentencing court." Id.
Thus, this Court held, the statute "requires that responsibility for the criminal
conduct be firmly established, much like a guilty plea, before the court can order
restitution." Id.; see also State v. Bickley, 2002 UT App 342, % 10, 60 P.3d 582 (rejecting
State's claim that defendant agreed to pay all child support owed because "'[w]ithout
making inferences as the trial court did, it cannot be said that [Defendant in this case]
admitted responsibility for' restitution prior to 1997") (quoting Watson, 1999 UT App
273, ^ 5) (second alteration in original); State v. Mast, 2001 UT App 402,ffi[17-18, 40
P.3d 1143 (rejecting State's claim that defendant who pleaded guilty to receiving stolen
property admitted responsibility for underlying burglary when she acknowledged to court
"that her version of events was 'far-fetched'"; reiterating that, before defendant can be
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ordered to pay restitution, her responsibility must be "'firmly established, much like a
guilty plea'") (citation omitted).
In the context of the plain language of section 76-3-201(1 )(b), the import of
Watson, Bickley, and Mast is clear: If a defendant has not been convicted of the criminal
conduct, he may only be ordered to pay restitution for it if he expressly acknowledges—
i.e., firmly establishes—responsibility for that conduct at sentencing. See Bickley, 2002
UT App 342, % 10; Mast, 2001 UT App 402,fflf17-18; Watson, 1999 UT App 273, % 5.
Because, as previously discussed, the restitution statute does not require actual admission
of guilt, see Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201(1 )(b), these cases reach no further.1
Here, defendant told the trial court at sentencing, "I feel responsible for [Amy
Tavey] dying" (R. 214:13-14). Thus, unlike in Bickley, Mast, or Watson, defendant here
expressly admitted responsibility for the uncharged criminal conduct, in this case, Amy
Tavey's murder. Under the restitution statute, then, defendant could properly be ordered
to pay restitution for that murder.
Still, defendant argues that restitution was improper because defendant's trial
counsel objected to it at defendant's sentencing. See Aplt. Br. at 36. However, trial
counsel's objection did nothing to detract from defendant's admission. See, e.g. State v.

'Indeed, to hold otherwise, i.e., to hold that the defendant must actually admit
criminal guilt, would render the latter part of the statute—"with or without an admission
of committing the criminal conduct"—inoperable. This Court must "'avoid
interpretations that will render portions of a statute superfluous or inoperative.'" Tooele
County, 2002 UT 8, ^ 10 (citation omitted).
9

Galli, 967 P.2d 930, 937-38 (Utah 1998) (holding that defense counsel's statements at
sentencing could not be attributed to defendant for purposes of determining restitution).
Alternatively, defendant claims restitution was improper because, at sentencing,
defendant "was adamantly maintaining his innocence to even the conviction relating to
Williams in addition to anything associated with Tavey." Aplt. Br. at 36. As already
discussed, however, the restitution statute focuses on a defendant's admission of
responsibility—legal, moral, or otherwise,—for the criminal conduct, not on the
defendant's admission of criminal liability for the conduct. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-3201(l)(b) (providing defendant can be ordered to pay restitution "with or without an
admission of committing the criminal conduct"). Thus, defendant's refusal to
acknowledge his guilt is irrelevant to whether restitution was properly ordered in this
case.
Because defendant admitted responsibility for Amy's murder to the sentencing
court, even though he did not admit actually committing that crime, the trial court did not
err in ordering defendant to pay restitution for that crime.
Consequently, defendant's claim fails.
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CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the State asks this Court to affirm defendant's
conviction and sentence, including the trial court's restitution order.

If January 2004.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED £f_
MARK L. SHURTLEFF
Utah Attorney General
KAREN A. KLUCZNIK
Assistant Attorney General

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I certify that on/y January 2004,1 caused to be mailed, by U.S. Mail, postage
prepaid, two accurate copies of this BRIEF OF APPELLEE to Patrick Lindsay and
Margaret P. Lindsay, Aldrich, Nelson, Weight & Esplin, 43 East 200 North, P.O. Box
"L," Provo, Utah 84603-0200, Attorneys for Appellant.
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Addendum A

Addendum A

76-3-201. Definitions — Sentences or combination of sentences allowed — Civil penalties — Hearing.
(1) As used in this section:
(a) "Conviction" includes a:
(i) judgment of guilt; and
(ii) plea of guilty.
(b) "Criminal activities" means any offense of which the defendant is
convicted or any other criminal conduct for which the defendant admits
responsibility to the sentencing court with or without an admission of
committing the criminal conduct.
(c) "Pecuniary damages" means all special damages, but not general
damages, which a person could recover against the defendant in a civil
action arising out of the facts or events constituting the defendant's
criminal activities and includes the money equivalent of property taken,
destroyed, broken, or otherwise harmed, and losses including earnings
and medical expenses.
(d) "Restitution" means full, partial, or nominal payment for pecuniary
damages to a victim, and payment for expenses to a governmental entity
for extradition or transportation and as further defined in Title 77,
Chapter 38a, Crime Victims Restitution Act.
(e) (i) "Victim" means any person who the court determines has suffered pecuniary damages as a result of the defendant's criminal
activities.
(ii) "Victim" does not include any coparticipant in the defendant's
criminal activities.
(2) Within the limits prescribed by this chapter, a court may sentence a
person convicted of an offense to any one of the following sentences or
combination of them:
fa) to pay a fine;
(b) to removal or disqualification from public or private office;
(c) to probation unless otherwise specifically provided by law;
id) to imprisonment;
(e) on or after April 27, 1992, to life in prison without parole; or
(f) to death.
(3) (a) This chapter does not deprive a court of authority conferred by law
to:
(i) forfeit property;
(ii) dissolve a corporation;
(iii) suspend or cancel a license;
(iv) permit removal of a person from office;
(v) cite for contempt; or
(vi) impose any other civil penalty,
(b) A civil penalty may be included in a sentence.
(4) (a) When a person is convicted of criminal activity that has resulted in
pecuniary damages, in addition to any other sentence it may impose, the
court shall order that the defendant make restitution to the victims, or for
conduct for which the defendant has agreed to make restitution as part of
a plea agreement.
(b) In determining whether restitution is appropriate, the court shall
follow the criteria and procedures as provided in Title 77, Chapter 38a,
Crime Victims Restitution Act.

(5) (a) In addition to any other sentence the court may impose, the court
shall order the defendant to pay restitution of governmental transportation expenses if the defendant was:
(i) transported pursuant to court order from one county to another
within the state at governmental expense to resolve pending criminal
charges;
(ii) charged with a felony or a class A, B, or C misdemeanor; and
(iii) convicted of a crime.
(b) The court may not order the defendant to pay restitution of
governmental transportation expenses if any of the following apply:
(i) the defendant is charged with an infraction or on a subsequent
failure to appear a warrant is issued for an infraction; or
(ii) the defendant was not transported pursuant to a court order.
(c) (i) Restitution of governmental transportation expenses under Subsection (5)(a)(i) shall be calculated according to the following schedule:
(A) $75 for up to 100 miles a defendant is transported;
(B) $125 for 100 up to 200 miles a defendant is transported;
and
(C) $250 for 200 miles or more a defendant is transported.
(ii) The schedule of restitution under Subsection (5)(c)(i) applies to
each defendant transported regardless of the number of defendants
actually transported in a single trip.
(d) If a defendant has been extradited to this state under Title 77,
Chapter 30, Extradition, to resolve pending criminal charges and is
convicted of criminal activity in the county to which he has been returned,
the court may, in addition to any other sentence it may impose, order that
the defendant make restitution for costs expended by any governmental
entity for the extradition.
(6) (a) If a statute under which the defendant was convicted mandates that
one of three stated minimum terms shall be imposed, the court shall order
imposition of the term of middle severity unless there are circumstances in
aggravation or mitigation of the crime.
(b) Prior to or at the time of sentencing, either party may submit a
statement identifying circumstances in aggravation or mitigation or
presenting additional facts. If the statement is in writing, it shall be filed
with the court and served on the opposing party at least four days prior to
the time set for sentencing.
(c) In determining whether there are circumstances that justify imposition of the highest or lowest term, the court may consider the record in
the case, the probation officer's report, other reports, including reports
received under Section 76-3-404, statements in aggravation or mitigation
submitted by the prosecution or the defendant, and any further evidence
introduced at the sentencing hearing.
(d) The court shall set forth on the record the facts supporting and
reasons for imposing the upper or lower term.
(e) In determining a just sentence, the court shall consider sentencing
guidelines regarding aggravating and mitigating circumstances promulgated by the Sentencing Commission.
(7) If during the commission of a crime described as child kidnapping, rape
of a child, object rape of a child, sodomy upon a child, or sexual abuse of a child,
the defendant causes substantial bodily injury to the child, and if the charge is
set forth in the information or indictment and admitted by the defendant, or
found true by a judge or jury at trial, the defendant shall be sentenced to the
highest minimum term in state prison. This subsection takes precedence over
any conflicting provision of law.

